Summary of Student Paper #1

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This paragraph sets up context for the issue as a whole. It invokes the figure of Darwin and suggests that since his theory of evolution and (gradual change) there has been a great desire to draw definitive lines that separate the very fine gradations of difference between species. The author posits that we, as humans, may need to reevaluate where the line between humans and non-humans should be drawn with regard to consciousness. The author suggests that where this line should be drawn today is different than where it has been drawn histtorically. Perhaps a discussion of where exactly it was drawn historically could prove useful.

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The first part of this paragraph is a disclaimer. It points out that any absolute verification of internal states of any living creature is impossible. From there the author puts forth a two-part thesis. One criteria for consciousness is the presence of pain. Another is animal's awareness of itself.

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The author reasons that we can come to discern whether another human is in pain by observing the behavior of the human. Although another human's internal state of mind is unverifiable, one infers with a great deal of assurance that, indeed, the other person is in pain. We know that this is the case for sure when the human subject says, "I'm in pain." With animals this kind of language is not an option, so one is left to draw conclusions about the animal mind strictly from observing the behavior of the animal.

The author goes on to cite an authority, philosopher Peter Singer, who reasons a similar postion with regard to pain. Singer even extends this argument to include the notion of basic physiological similarity.

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Thsi small paragraph after the previous quote [which, by the way, is not properly cited] seems to be the author's of explaining the above qute. The author does this by reiterating in abbreviated form the gist of Singer's position. She states that it is self-evident. It is obvious. Thsi can prove to be a particularly weak strategy for warranting the use of particular evidence. Perhaps another way of warranting the use of this argument would be to discuss why Singer is seen as an authority on the subject. Perhaps one could also discuss why pain is such an important factor in determining consciousness in animals.

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This paragraph begins to introduce the matter of self-awareness. The paragraph sets off on a course of describing Gordon Gallup's famous mirror test. It discusses the results of the experiment, and it draws conclusions about what these results mean with regard to animal consciousness.

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Here the author advances the term self-recognition which should be differentiated from self-awareness. The author mentions the additional characteristic of "having insight into the mental states of others" as important to establishing self-recognition for an animal. The author explains how awareness of another's mental state signals that it probably recognizes its own mental state.

The author then sets up an experimental procedure at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig, Germany.

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Thsi short pargraph is again a brief explanation of what the above experiment [again, this quoted material is not properly cited] indicated. The explanation straightforwardly states that it demonstrates awareness of position in a hierarchy and the awareness of desore in another chimp. However, the implications of what the recognition of desire in a chimp are not fully explored. Awareness of a desire in another chimp would satisfy the notion that chimps are able to recognize a state of mind in another (and, therefore, in themselves too), and this would suggest that chimps do possess a theory of mind, certainly one of the main criteria for establishing "higher-order" consciousness.

More painstaking explanaton of what actually transpired in the experiment would allow the author to discuss why it is justified to conclude that this experiment demonstrates awareness of another mental state (desire) in another animal. Can all kinds of learned responses or instinctual responses be ruled out in this behavior? Is there any anthropomorphizing being done?

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Thsi final paragraph attempts to broach the subject of our responsibility towards animals. Are there any reasonable legal or moral constraints to take into consideration? The author seems to draw the line at pain. But what kinds of actions on the part of humans should be allowed according to this abitrarily drawn line?

Also, how does the author plan to incorporate the theory of mind that was alluded to earlier in an assessment of what may be done or should be done to animals? The last line seems to only hint at this, but it is not very specific.

Overall comments

The paper is fairly well organized. It asserts its two primary criteria for animal consciousness in the second paragraph. It reasons its position with regard to pain precisely and accurately. As well, the author cites a recognizable authority to buttress his/her position.

The paper's second criteria, recognition of a state of mind in another animal, is a bit shakier. The evidence cited is appropriate. It does seem to illustrate what the author is talking about. But the notion the author is teasing out is a thorny one and needs to be done with the utmost care. Further discussion of the implications and possible failings of the experiment might be on order.

Finally, the conclusion is a bit vague about what kinds of specific actions can be or should be taken with regard to animals. The theory of mind which the author labored so to include seems to play only a tangential role at this point.