Student Paper #1
Animal Consciousness
Since Charles Darwin's work, which emphasized continuity in evolution from animals to people in their mental abilities and in physical characteristics, scientists' have worked to understand the basic principles and processes that underlie the behavior of all creatures, human and nonhuman. As knowledge has accumulated, identification of characteristics to different species has yielded information that contributes to the understanding of animal consciousness. Many people still believe humans are at the top of the evolutionary tree and that there exists an unbridgeable gap separating humans from other animals. While I am not ready to concede that I am a direct descendent of the ape, I do believe some members of the non-human sect share enough similarities with humans that it requires a need to re-evaluate the defining line of animal consciousness.
Each one of us knows that we are conscious but it is almost impossible to determine whether another species is conscious, because of the private and subjective nature of consciousness. Although we can never get inside the head of another creature science is increasingly developing techniques to understand consciousness. There does not appear to be the great gulf that for many years has separated humans from animals. Much of the new information that has evolved leads me to believe that animal consciousness can be defined at two levels. First, the most primary level being if an animal experiences or appears to experience pain and secondly, if an animal posses the quality of mind that provides the ability to recognize its own existence, self-awareness.
Pain is an extremely subjective topic even within the human population. When one sees another person that is hurt or exhibiting the behaviors that we identify with being hurt, they invariably and almost automatically assume to know how that person feels and no one questions it. If someone saw another person who was barefoot step on a piece of glass and immediately jerk their foot up and yell, the deduction that the person was in pain would be accepted. This knowledge is conjecture based on ones familiarity with the experience and the resulting behavior. If a human and a non-human were both poked with a needle and both jerked away from the needle followed by a wince the logical conclusion to me would be that they both experienced pain. According to Peter Singer most of the external signs leading us to conclude that humans experience pain are also seen in other species, especially mammals and birds. What's more, the nervous systems are very similar to humans and react physiologically much like ours when the circumstances are comparable. Some of the similarities include a rise in blood pressure and pulse rate, perspiration, dilated pupils and a fall in blood pressure if the pain persists over a period of time. Singer further states:
The nervous systems of animals evolved as our own did, and in fact the evolutionary history of human beings and other animals, especially mammals, did not diverge until the central features of our nervous systems were already in existence.
It seems irrational for me to believe that when similar experiences result in like forms of behavior with nervous systems that are comparable in origin and function that the resulting experiences could be different.
The second issue that I believe needs to be re-evaluated in defining the line of animal consciousness is the matter of self-awareness. Researchers of animal behavior have long suspected that some non-human primates have awareness of its own existence. This theory has been presented in research with what is known as "the mirror test." Most animals upon seeing a reflection of them self respond as if confronted by another animal (Can Animals Empathize, online). However, Gordon Gallop reported, in his research chimpanzees and orangutans learned that the image in the mirror was it self Gallop allowed the chimps time to become familiar with their reflections in the mirror and then afterwards anesthetized them. While asleep he applied red dye to an eyebrow ridge and to the top half of the opposite ear. "Later, on awakening and seeing themselves in the mirror, the chimpanzees reached up and touched the red marks on their faces, following this in some instances with looking at and smelling their fingers" (Can Animals Empathize, online). For an animal to recognize itself it must have a sense of self However undeveloped, it is self-awareness. The mirror test has been given to many other animals, including different primates, dolphins, birds and even elephants but only chimpanzees and orangutans over and over again pass the test.
Evidence also suggests that self-recognition not only implies self-awareness but insight into the mental states of others. A cognitive characteristic, psychologists call theory of mind, links self-awareness and other-awareness. We presume to know what another is thinking (other-awareness) based on our assumption that others experience things as we do (self-awareness). We interpret, predict and judge others behaviors based on that assumption. If an animal has awareness of itself does it have awareness of mental states in others? In a study preformed at the Max Planck institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany chimpanzees were tested in circumstances that was more closely linked to their own lives. Rather than using a human to test with a chimp, a test was devised to see if a chimp could tell what another chimp was seeing and thus thinking. The setup involved three opaque cages in a row, with a chimp in the first and third cage. Food was placed in the middle cage. The experiment went as follows:
The doors from the outer cages to the middle one were first opened just enough that each chimp could peek at the food and see that the other chimp was eyeing it too. When the door was opened fully, only the dominant chimp of the pair retrieved the food, as would have been the case in the wild.
The researchers then placed a barrier in such a way that the dominant chimp could see only one piece of food, but the subordinate could see both and could also see that only one piece of food was in view of the dominant chimp. This time, the subordinate took the piece of food that the dominant one couldn't see, suggesting that it knew the dominant was unaware of this food's existence. And when the dominant chimp was replaced with a chimp even lower on the hierarchy, the newly dominant chimp first went after the food both chimps could see--grabbing the potentially more contested item first--and them retrieved the second piece. Thus the chimp's response varied depending on its fellow's identity and what it could see, suggesting an understanding of another's visual perspective.
In this experiment the chimpanzees are not only aware of themselves and their position in the hierarchy, there is also a rudimentary awareness of the other chimps desire to get the food.
As our knowledge and understanding of animal consciousness has expanded and the once thought unbridgeable gap is lessening,the moral issues surrounding treatment of non-human animals is in question. The line between what is substantial and what is insubstantial pain and suffering both physically and mentally needs to be carefully assessed based on the needs and responses of each species. Animals do not live in a state of mind equivalent to a sleepwalking person, not aware of what's going on.
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